The IAFOR Journal of Politics, Economics & Law
Volume 3 – Issue – I

The IAFOR Journal of Politics, Economics & Law
Volume 3 – Issue – I

The IAFOR Journal of Politics, Economics & Law
Volume 3 – Issue – I

Tun Abdul Razak’s counterinsurgency (COIN) through security and development (KESBAN)
strategy, in contending the illegal communist activities led by the Communist Party of Malaya
(CPM), was a successful COIN strategy. In the case of Malaysia, even though the First
Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) was declared over in 1960, the communist insurgents were
still continuously active in expanding their covert agenda. Thus, their subversive movement
gave a significant threat to national security during the Malaysian Second Premiership, of Tun
Abdul Razak Bin Hussien Al-Haj. The objective of this paper is to highlight the national
security strategy crafted during Tun Abdul Razak’s premiership in the 1970s, that contributed
to the success of countering communist insurgents. This period of low-intensity conflict
between the Government of Malaysia and the CPM, also known as the Second Emergency
(1969-1989), was a tough and challenging phase for Malaysia, to ensure its survival as the
sovereign state. KESBAN, taken from the Malay words KESELAMATAN and
PEMBANGUNAN, or security and development, was originated during Tun Abdul Razak’s
premiership, albeit KESBAN was formally much later legislated in 1980 by the National
Security Council (NSC). The paper discovers Tun Abdul Razak’s national security strategy to
counter communist insurgents did not solely rely on the usage of hard power; the concentration
of his strategy was on internal development, that led to victory on the side of the Malaysian
government, to end the illegal guerrilla activities of Communist insurgents, and unite the multiethnic
society
in
Malaysia.
KESBAN
was
an
admirable
COIN
strategy
for
a
small
country
with

a
multi-ethnic society.
Keywords: COIN, Strategy, Security, Internal Development, Second Emergency

Craig Mark